(If you don’t follow discussions about the nature of the unconscious closely, this post probably won’t interest you. It is possible to follow the logic of my argument. However, it will be hard to get much beyond that from this post.)

Gollwitzer, Bayer, and McCullough, in their article, “The Control of the Unwanted”, attempt to make a distinction between implementation intention and a goal intention statements. For example, they suggest that an implementation intention statement takes the following form, “If situation X is encountered, then I will perform behavior Y!” It is then suggested that a goal intention statement takes the form, “I intend to reach Z!” Further, they claim that implementation intention statements are different from goal intention statements in that they specify the “when”, “where”, and “how” of a goal-directed response. That is, only implementation intention statements serve goal intention statements by providing the content (or the context) of goal intention statements. This view is not without its problems. 

For example, they use the statement, “I will not let myself get distracted!” to illustrate a goal intention. It appears to represent just a goal intention statement because it doesn’t take the conditional (i.e. if-then) form of an implementation intention statement. However, it isn’t clear how such a statement (or any statement for that matter) could make sense outside of a context. If the statement doesn’t make sense on its own then this means that it only makes sense within a context. If this is true then the statement should be put in the if-then form. At this point, the statement would be intelligible. For example, “If the truck backfires, I will not let myself get distracted!” But this is a problem for the authors’ view because lacking the if-then form is one of the defining characteristics of a goal intention statement compared to an implementation intention statement.

Secondly, if the statement, “I will not let myself get distracted!” only makes sense within a context, for example, “I will not let myself get distracted when my mind is attentive to some more important task”, then one has just specified when she will not get distracted. That is, one has just specified the context (or content) of the goal intention. This is a problem for the authors’ view because they suggest that implementation intention statements provide the “when” (i.e. the context and content) of a goal directed response. The fact that statements only make sense within a context provides a constraint on how “contentless” goal intention statements can be. That is, when making a goal intention statement like the authors’ provided, one is left with making either an unintelligible statement or a goal intention statement which is context and content laden. If a goal intention statement is content laden (e.g. providing the “when”, “where”, or “how” of a goal-directed response) then it isn’t sufficiently different from an implementation intention statement.

(“The Control of the Unwanted” can be found in, The New Unconscious.)

Best,
MLN